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Comment Dan A. Black
Decressin, Hill, McCue, and Stinson (DHMS henceforth) should be con-
gratulated for a very good chapter. Moreover, the profession owes them a
debt of gratitude for their eﬀorts to create this intriguing data set. Econo-
mists are heavy users of data sets, but we seem to undervalue the eﬀort and
creativity associated with the creation of data. The authors of this chapter
have done an immense amount of work creating an important data set that
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(NORC) at the University of Chicago.links employers and employees with administrative data on the fringe ben-
eﬁts oﬀered by employers. In addition, their chapter provides some in-
triguing relationships between the performance of ﬁrms and the ﬁrms’ de-
cisions about whether to oﬀer fringe beneﬁts. In many ways, in the analysis
of this chapter DHMS raise more questions than they answer. In this com-
ment, I would like to focus on two important issues that jumped out at me
when I read their chapter.
Using these data, the latter part of their chapter examines the associa-
tion of fringe beneﬁts and ﬁrm turnover, employment growth, productiv-
ity, and the likelihood the ﬁrm goes out of business. While the link between
the association and causality is tenuous at best without a better model of
the contracts between workers and their ﬁrms, these associations are sug-
gestive of an important role of fringe beneﬁts in the labor market. In their
analysis, DHMS ﬁnd that the provision of fringe beneﬁts is associated with
lower turnover, higher productivity growth, and a higher probability of
surviving. Of course, these are good outcomes for the ﬁrms, and a natural
concern is that there is another omitted factor that reduces turnover, in-
creases productivity growth, and increases the probability of surviving, as
well as allowing ﬁrms to oﬀer fringe beneﬁts. Obviously, an important next
step would be to develop a model of the provision of fringe beneﬁts and
ﬁnd some variables that would not directly aﬀect the outcomes of interest,
but would aﬀect the likelihood that a ﬁrm does indeed oﬀer fringe beneﬁts.
With such exclusion restrictions, we could then see if the intriguing associ-
ations documented in this chapter are in fact causal.
In the rest of this comment, I want to focus on the problem of measure-
ment error when one matches employer and employee data. Due to the na-
ture of the matching process, there are a lot of false negatives: many workers
who in fact may have fringe beneﬁts are not matched. In table 13C.1, I re-
produce a comparison that DHMS make between Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics (BLS) estimates of pension and health insurance with similar estimates
from their data. One of the more striking features in DHMS data is the low
incidence they ﬁnd of health insurance. While their pension coverage ap-
pears to be measured very well, their measures of health insurance coverage
are poor. Because of this measurement error, DHMS aggregate their mea-
sure into a single variable: whether the ﬁrm oﬀers any fringe beneﬁts.
Usually, measurement error in a binary variable is a problem without in-
struments: ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are attenuated.1 Be-
cause of the peculiar form of the measurement error, however, the situation
is much more promising. Because we assured that there are virtually no
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1. Instrumental variable (IV) estimates are biased away from zero; see Black, Berger, and
Scott (2000). Black, Berger, and Scott, as well as Kane, Rouse, and Staiger (1999) discuss how
identiﬁcation may be achieved with two measures of the binary variable; Frazis and Loewen-
stein (2003) extend the analysis to any instruments. See Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz
(2001) for an excellent discussion.false positive matches—workers incorrectly matched to ﬁrms—we may be
assured that virtually all of the matched workers do indeed have the pen-
sion and health insurance ascribed to them. This allows the research to
measure correctly one of two moment conditions, which allows for identi-
ﬁcation under much weaker assumptions. To see why, consider the impact
of beneﬁt coverage on an outcome, yi. We wish to estimate:
(1)  (X)   E(yi |X, C   1)   E(yi |X, C   0)
where  (X ) are the parameters of interest. We compare the expectation of
our outcome when a worker is covered (C   1) to the expectation of our
outcome when a worker is not covered (C   0), conditional on the realiza-
tion of some covariates (X). When there are no false positives, we may es-
timate E(yi |X, C   1) from the noisy measure of coverage E(yi |X, C ˜   1)
if we are willing to assume that E(yi |X, C ˜   1)   E(yi |X, C   1) so that
the mismeasurement is uncorrelated with yi.
The problem is that E(yi |X, C ˜   0) is contaminated with false negatives.
Thus, we have
(2) E(yi |X, C ˜   0)    (X)E(yi |X, C   1, C ˜   0)
  [1    (X)]E(yi |X, C   0).
Fortunately, we have an estimate of E(yi |X, C   1, C ˜   0), which should
just be E(yi|X, C ˜   1) under the assumption that E(yi|X, C ˜   1)  
E(yi|X, C 1). Thus, equation (2) has only two unknown parameters:  (X)
and E(yi | X, C   0). If we may use alternative data sets that allow us to es-
timate, conditional on X, the probability of beneﬁt coverage, then we may
obtain estimates of  (X). This would then allow the researcher to recover
estimates of E(yi |X, C   0) directly from equation (2). Thus, with auxil-
iary data on the probability of coverage, it would be possible to identify the
parameters of interest nonparametrically if we are, of course, willing to
make the assumption that E(yi | X, C ˜   1)   E(yi | X, C   1).
This is potentially an important result because, as we see the growth of
more and more data of the type that DHMS use (matched administrative
records), this is likely to become a more common form of measurement er-
ror. If the matching problem is severe (as it is in the DHMS measure of the
coverage of health insurance), we may at least take some comfort from the
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Table 13C.1 Comparison of pension and health insurance coverage rates
Pension coverage Health insurance coverage
BLS 56% 86%
DHMS 61% 34%
Source: Decressin, Hill, McCue, and Stinson (chapter 13, this volume).fact that attenuation bias may be corrected through the use of auxiliary
data.
This result also has some important implications for how data matching
should be performed. Often researchers are confronted with tough deci-
sions regarding whether a particular pair is correctly matched. This anal-
ysis suggests that researchers should be quite demanding on the data be-
fore agreeing that there is a true match. This will insure that we have the
necessary one-sided error that allows us to recover the parameters of in-
terest. Of course, if the researcher wants to perform a probabilistic match
for observations that may be correctly matched, an indicator variable that
documents perfect matches will also allow researchers to recover the pa-
rameters of interest, as well as assess the accuracy of their probabilistic
matches.
Of course, the identiﬁcation is achieved only if we are able to maintain
the assumption that E(yi | X, C ˜   1)   E(yi | X, C   1). Assessing the va-
lidity of this assumption is, of course, quite diﬃcult. As DHMS document,
the match rate varies systematically with ﬁrm size, and the variation is
larger than what we would expect if the variation were solely due to diﬀer-
ences in the rates of provision of fringe beneﬁts. We know, of course, that
there are systematic diﬀerences in outcomes by ﬁrm size so it would be pru-
dent to include ﬁrm size in the vector of covariates. One fears, however, that
conditional on coverage, unmatched ﬁrms are simply inferior at ﬁlling out
paperwork (hence the lack of a match), but these ﬁrms are also inferior at
running their businesses and hence have worse outcomes on the average.
Unfortunately, there is little empirical content to the assumption that
E(yi | X, C ˜   1)   E(yi | X, C   1). If means are suﬃciently disparate, it is
possible that the observed mean, E(yi | X, C ˜   0), will not allow the impo-
sition of E(yi | X, C ˜   1)   E(yi | X, C   1), but this is quite unlikely unless
the means E(yi | X, C   1, C ˜   0) and E(yi | X, C   0) are greatly diﬀerent
than the E(yi | X, C ˜   1). In most applications, however, one suspects that
the means are not that greatly diﬀerent and so the assumption will pass this
weak test.
At some level, the lack of empirical content of the identiﬁcation assump-
tion is troublesome. Clearly, one would prefer a strong test of the identiﬁca-
tion assumption before we make heavy use of it. Yet most empirical papers
make another, even stronger assumption: there is no measurement error in
the data used. More importantly, I think this identiﬁcation strategy shows
that there may be immense value to matching employer and employee data
even when the match rates may be quite low. As long as researchers can use
the resulting data to estimate accurately one of the two moment conditions,
the use of auxiliary data may allow researchers to recover the parameters of
interest despite very high levels of measurement error.
Again, DHMS should be congratulated for a very good chapter and
their immense eﬀorts in the creation of this extremely interesting data set.
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